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Where Should Europe’s 
Investment Path Lead? 
Reflections on August 
Reinisch, “Quo Vadis 
Europe?” 
Julie A. Maupin* 
Abstract 
Relative to the past policies of its Member States, will the European Union’s new 
comprehensive international investment policy constitute a step forward, a step backward, 
or a perpetuation of the status quo?  Professor Reinisch’s contribution to this volume opens 
a wide window on the current state of the debate.  His cogent analysis suggests that, at 
present, all three possibilities remain live ones, although some basic contours of a likely 
trajectory are beginning to take shape.  I use his musings as a springboard to investigate 
two questions which follow naturally from his. That is, in view of Professor Reinisch’s 
response to the question “where are you going, Europe?” I ask, first, where should 
European investment policy go next, and second, who should decide?  These normative 
questions are pressing and require thoughtful answers developed through inter-
institutional dialogue.  If the new EU-wide investment policy is to succeed, their resolution 
must take precedence over the more mundane, technical matters that have consumed the 
bulk of scholarly attention so far.  
 
* Lecturing Fellow in International Law and Research Fellow, Center for Comparative and 
International Law, Duke University School of Law.  Comments and criticisms welcome at:  
maupin@law.duke.edu.  Particular thanks are due to August Reinisch for providing such a 
thoughtful piece on which to comment.  For helpful discussions, I am also grateful to Jan 
Kleinheisterkamp, Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, and the organizers of and participants in the 
Symposium, “The Law and Politics of Foreign Investment,” held at Santa Clara Law School 
(February 1-2, 2013). 
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Introduction 
European international investment policy stands at a crossroads.  With the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty,1 foreign direct investment (FDI) now falls within the ambit of 
the Common Commercial Policy of the European Union.2  In effect, this means that the 
negotiation and ratification of international investment treaties will in the future be 
conducted by the various organs of the Union acting on an EU-wide level rather than by 
the individual Member States acting in their own capacity and on their own behalf.  The 
Lisbon Treaty thus promises to bring about a much needed harmonization of the Member 
States’ hitherto disparate approaches to protecting and promoting foreign direct 
investment flows across their sovereign borders. 
Yet the crossroads at which the EU now finds itself is no simple Y-junction.  Looking 
backwards, its 27 Member States have not all come by the same road.  Germany arrives 
off a veritable super-highway of investment treaty activism, with nearly 120 existing 
bilateral investment treaties in tow.3  Ireland, by contrast, seemingly drops out of the sky 
with none.4  The remaining 25 EU member countries approach from all manner of 
winding roads, each transporting varying numbers of investment treaties falling 
somewhere between these two extremes.5  All told, the European Union must, in the 
coming years, replace 1407 existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with 
consolidated EU-wide agreements.6 
 
1. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. 
2. See Consolidated Version of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 206, 
207(1), 207(4), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter Consolidated TFEU]. The full texts 
of these articles are set forth in Professor Reinisch’s contribution to the present volume (August 
Reinisch, The EU on the Investment Path – Quo Vadis Europe? The Future of EU BITs and other 
Investment Agreements, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 111 (2013) [hereinafter Reinisch, Quo Vadis 
Europe?]). Consolidated versions of all of the currently applicable EU treaties referenced in this 
comment may also be found in, Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, Council of the European Union, October 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 55 
[hereinafter Consolidated TEU, Consolidated TFEU, and EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
respectively], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:PDF.  
3. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy, COM (2010) 343 final (July 7, 
2010) [hereinafter Commission – Towards a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy], available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/july/tradoc_146307.pdf. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Ahmad Ali Ghouri, Resolving Incompatibilities of Bilateral Investment Treaties of the EU Member 
States with the EC Treaty: Individual and Collective Options, 16 EUR. L. J. 806, 819 tbl.6 (2010) 
(U.K.).  This includes 1031 BITs concluded by Member States with non-EU states (extra-EU BITs) 
and 376 BITs concluded by EU Member States inter se (intra-EU BITs) but does not count the 
several hundred other agreements that have been signed by Member States but have not yet 
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Looking forward, too, the crossroads at which the EU stands is not a typical fork in 
the road.  At such a fork, one has the luxury of choosing among a small number of well-
defined paths with the reasonable certainty that they will lead to known destinations.  
The EU, however, seeks to chart a path to the promised land of sustainable development 
and economic prosperity for all.7  It is generally agreed that this Promised Land lies 
somewhere beyond the wilderness of foreign investment policy.8  But from the current 
vantage point, numerous paths leading off in different directions through the wilderness 
are discernible – some more trodden9 and others less so.10  The EU must now choose 
among these paths or decide to blaze a new trail of its own.  In making this choice, it 
must do its best to anticipate and prepare for the various kinds of natural hazards it is 
likely to encounter along the way. 
In his piece The EU on the Investment Path – Quo Vadis Europe?, Professor Reinisch 
has done a remarkable job of providing a relief map to help would-be explorers of EU 
investment law and policy get the lay of the land.  He explains in lucid terms what the 
Lisbon Treaty means and what it doesn’t mean for the EU’s investment policymaking 
competence moving forward.  Anyone who knows anything about the complexity of EU 
law will immediately recognize that this expositional accomplishment is no small 
potatoes.   
 
entered into force.  For a list of all extra-EU BITs, including those signed but not yet in force, see 
List of the Bilateral Investment Agreements Referred to in Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 
1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing Transitional 
Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Agreements between Member States and Third Countries, 
art. 4(1), 2013 O.J. (C 131/02), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:131:0002:0098:EN:PDF. 
7. See article 3(3) of the Consolidated TEU.  Consolidated TEU, Consolidated TFEU, and EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 2, at 19 (setting forth the Union’s goals concerning 
sustainable development, full employment, environmental protection, scientific advancement, 
social inclusion, etc). 
8. See Commission – Towards a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 3, at p. 3 (“While 
the relationship between FDI and economic growth and welfare is a complex one, on balance, both 
inward and outward investment have a positive impact on growth and employment in and outside 
the EU, including in developing countries.”); Council of the EU, Conclusions on a comprehensive 
European international investment policy, 3041st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, para. 1 (Oct. 
25, 2010), [hereinafter Council – Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy], 
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/117328.pdf 
(“[acknowledging] the crucial role of foreign direct investment in fostering competitiveness, 
economic growth and productivity, strengthening trade relations between nations, contributing to 
sustainable development, job creation and enhanced consumer benefits”); and European 
Parliament Resolution of 6 April 2011 on the Future European International Investment Policy, 
(2010/2203 (INI)) para J.7 [hereinafter “Parliament – Resolution on a Future EU Investment 
Policy], available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-
2011-0141&language=EN (“investment can have a positive impact on growth and jobs, not only in 
the EU but also in developing countries”). 
9. Like the recent Canadian and US Model BIT paths. 
10. For example, the Gillard government announced a policy of omitting investor-state dispute 
settlement from future Australian investment treaties. 
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Professor Reinisch’s article, however, goes well beyond the art of eloquent exposition 
to make several other notable contributions, two of which I will highlight here.  The first 
is to shed light on how the inter-institutional power struggles being waged by the 
principal EU organs, namely, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the 
Council of the European Union (Council), and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU), are shaping the future of EU international investment law and policy.  By way 
of illustration, Professor Reinisch charts how these power struggles have brought about a 
situation in which the EU’s new purported “exclusive competence”11 over investment 
policymaking may actually amount to a mixed competence shared with the Member 
States.12  He points out that, during the transitional period, Member States still retain 
important powers like the ability to conclude new BITs with countries with whom the EU 
is not actively pursuing negotiations, albeit subject to an increased level of oversight by 
the Commission.13  And even beyond the transitional period, the Member States (acting 
through the Council) will enjoy an effective veto over the Commission’s EU-wide 
investment treaty negotiating initiatives, thanks to a special unanimity requirement 
included in the Lisbon Treaty.14   
Professor Reinisch deserves credit for underlining these structural features of the new 
European regime.  In doing so, he reminds the scholarly and policy-making communities 
that the EU’s much-discussed new competence in this domain is not quite as exclusive 
and may not prove quite as unifying as some harmonization advocates might hope. 
In a second key contribution, Professor Reinisch peeks under the bonnet of the EU’s 
developing investment treaty negotiating agenda to provide an idea of where the new EU 
policy appears to be heading in practice.15  He does this by interweaving details from the 
Commission’s various policy communications with revelations from the Council’s leaked 
Negotiating Directives to the Commission.16  This discussion reveals that the 
 
11. Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, at arts. 207 and 3(1) (the former includes foreign direct 
investment within the areas covered by the Common Commercial Policy, and the latter assigns 
the Union exclusive competence over the Policy). 
12. Reinisch, Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2, at 122 (noting that “[t]he Council’s compromise 
position appears to be its insistence on investment as an area of mixed competences between the 
Union and its members”).  
13. See Regulation 1219/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 2012 
Establishing Transitional Arrangements for the Bilateral Investment Agreements Between 
Member States and Third Countries, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 40, 42 (EU) [hereinafter EU Regulation 
Establishing Transitional Arrangements] (Authorisation to amend or conclude bilateral 
investment agreements), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:351:0040:0046:EN:PDF. 
14. Reinisch, Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2, at 114 (quoting the Consolidated TFEU’s “special 
unanimity requirement”). 
15. Id. at 123. 
16. This document, which concerns imminent or ongoing EU negotiations with Canada, India and 
Singapore, was obtained and leaked by NGOs.  See Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India 
and Singapore) (EC), 12 September 2011 [hereinafter Council – Negotiating Directives (Canada, 
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Commission intends, at least for now, to pursue investment agreements which 
essentially hew to the model of the numerous 1980s and 1990s era investment treaties 
concluded by several influential Member States.17  Professor Reinisch notes that there 
seems to be no concrete plan in place as yet to address the many regulatory concerns 
which the European Parliament has raised about the suitability of these older model 
investment treaties within a 21st century international governance environment.18  In the 
final section of his article, he does an admirable job of highlighting this and other items 
one might expect to emerge as “controversial issues” over the coming years as the EU’s 
future union-wide investment policy continues to take shape.19  He concludes—correctly, 
I suspect—that the final word on many of the most pressing open questions will likely 
come from the CJEU. 
Overall, there is little I could add to Professor Reinisch’s insightful analysis of his 
chosen topics.  Instead, in my remarks, I wish to explore two questions which his analysis 
invites but does not address.20  They are, to my mind, the elephants in the room.  First, 
where should European investment policy go next (as distinguished from where is it 
going at present)?  And second, who should decide?  These are plainly normative 
questions and difficult ones at that.  Rather than purporting to offer definitive answers—
a task that would exceed the scope of my limited reflections by a wide margin—I will 
confine myself to suggesting what I consider to be some worthwhile cogitations in 
approaching each of the two questions raised. 
The remainder of this comment proceeds as follows.  Part I explores the “ought,” 
question:  where should European investment policy go next?  I triangulate this query 
from the perspectives of empirics, policy, and practical implementation.  After setting out 
some of the relevant considerations, Part II then asks the authority question:  who 
should decide?  I examine what the functional purposes and comparative strengths of the 
EU’s four principal organs (Parliament, Council, Commission, and Court) suggest about 
the role each should play in shaping the future streamlined EU-wide investment policy.  
The final section concludes with a critical assessment of how much room the day-to-day 
 
India and Singapore)], available at http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article20272&lang=en and 
http://www.s2bnetwork.org/themes/eu-investment-policy/eu-documents/text-of-the-
mandates.html. 
17. Reinisch, Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2, at 123-32. 
18. Reinisch notes that the protection of sovereign regulatory space is an objective shared in principle 
by the Parliament, the Council, and the Commission.  Id. at 142.  However, he seems to take for 
granted that the EU’s practice of including a general statement concerning the right to regulate in 
introductory chapter to its trade agreements will prove sufficient to protect Member States’ 
regulatory space when faced with investor-state arbitration claims under investment treaties.  
This proposition seems dubious in the light of certain investment treaty arbitration decisions to 
the contrary.  For a more extensive consideration of this topic, see Jan Kleinheisterkamp, 
European Policy Space in International Investment Law, 27 ICSID REV. 416 (2012). 
19. Reinisch, Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2, at 135-56. 
20. In this sense, I aim more to extend than to critique Professor Reinisch’s argument. 
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exigencies of EU politics and bureaucracy leave for the kind of robust normative debate I 
propose.  In my own circumspect but hopeful estimation, the answer is:  enough. 
I. Where Should EU Investment Policy Go Next? 
Contemplating the future can be alternately exciting, terrifying, or both.  But if it is to 
be something other than stultifying, it must be done in a manner which allows the 
contemplator to develop a reasonably well-conceived plan for moving from point A to 
point B.  This, of course, requires having at least a rough idea of where points A and B 
lie.  As with most other public policy matters, figuring out “where to next?” in European 
international investment policy requires looking at the question from three different 
angles:  past empirics, future goals, and practical implementation considerations.  I take 
each in turn. 
A. A Question of Empirics 
In order to determine where the EU should move next with its international 
investment agreements, it is first necessary to take stock of what its Member States have 
achieved in the past through their respective investment policies and treaties.  The 
principal documents released to-date by the Commission and the Council have evinced 
surprisingly little interest in this stocktaking exercise.  The Commission, in its 
communiqué titled “Towards a comprehensive European international investment 
policy,” set out the number of extant BITs maintained by EU Member States.21  It failed, 
however, to analyze the concrete impact of any of these BITs on European investors, EU 
Member States, or the European investment environment as a whole.  Instead, the 
Commission seems to have contented itself with two vague nods to a limited subset of the 
existing empirical literature on investment treaties.  The first directs the reader without 
comment to “the extensive analytical work performed by international organizations such 
as [the] OECD and UNCTAD.”22  The second references a single study in support of the 
assertion that: 
[r]esearch confirms that substantive investment provisions in broad trade 
agreements impact trade and FDI flows more profoundly, or that the combination 
of substantive investment rules and provisions liberalizing other parts of the 
economy jointly impact trade and investment more significantly.23 
 
21. Commission – Towards a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 3, at 4 (“the ‘BITs and 
pieces’ of investment policy”) and Annex (“Overview of the number of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties concluded by Member States”). 
22. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
23. Id. at n.13 (citing OECD (2006), Analysis of the economic impact of investment provision in 
regional trade agreements, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 36, 11.07.2006). 
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The communiqué made no attempt to probe the possible policy-making significance of 
the “or” in this quote.  Nor did it explain what the “extensive analytical work” by the 
OECD and UNCTAD actually reveals about the effectiveness of investment treaties.  (It 
turns out some of it is quite critical on certain points.24)  Much less did the communiqué 
refer to the many academic studies which have so far found no conclusive evidence of a 
positive causal relationship between international investment treaties and investment 
flows to the states that sign them.25   
The Council’s statement in response to the Commission’s communiqué proved even 
less searching on the empirical front.  It began with a sweeping acknowledgment of “the 
crucial role of foreign direct investment in fostering competitiveness, economic growth 
and productivity, strengthening trade relations between nations, contributing to 
sustainable development, job creation and enhanced consumer benefits.”26  It made no 
attempt, however, to discover what is known about the precise role foreign direct 
investment plays in contributing to each of these noble goals.  In particular, it nowhere 
examined the relationship between these objectives and the decision to conclude EU-wide 
investment treaties, which provide foreign investors with extensive substantive legal 
protections backed by international arbitration.  Yet these fact-finding omissions did not 
deter the Council from authoritatively asserting that the EU’s future investment policy 
“should not negatively affect investor protection and guarantees enjoyed under the 
existing [bilateral investment] agreements”27 and should, in fact, “increase the current 
level of protection and legal security for the European investor abroad.”28 
The European Parliament, for its part, did respond to the Commission’s communiqué 
with a more evaluative approach.  While it did not engage directly with any of the 
empirical studies mentioned above, it did begin its response with a series of stocktaking 
recitations in which it laid out some of the more problematic outcomes of states’ past 
 
24. See, e.g., UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, at 3 (2012) 
(recommending a “new generation” of investment policies in part in reaction to what it 
describes on the publication website as “systemic flaws in the current system”), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2012d5_en.pdf. 
25. For an overview, see Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct 
Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2011) (summarizing the 
existing literature as concluding that investment treaties do not produce increases in investment 
inflows, and finding additionally that investment treaties do not factor into the decision-making 
processes of company executives when deciding whether to undertake foreign investments nor of 
risk insurers when calculating premiums for political risk insurance policies).  See also Jonathan 
Bonnitcha, The Economics of Investment Treaty Protection and the Evolving Empirical Research 
Agenda (Australian National University - Crawford School of Public Policy, Working Paper, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2138235  (suggesting future directions for empirical research 
that might shed light on important questions other than the relationship between investment 
treaties and investment flows). 
26. Council – Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, para. 1. 
27. Id. at para. 9. 
28. Id. at para. 8 (emphasis added). 
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investment treaty practices.29  It noted, for example, that while “inward investment can 
improve host countries’ competitiveness, outward investment sometimes necessitates 
adjustment assistance for low-skilled workers.”30  It expressed concern that past BITs 
have “enabled some enterprises to file suits against their own countries.”31  It also took 
issue with the way in which past investment treaties have been interpreted and applied 
in practice, stating: 
A number of problems became clear because of the use of vague language in 
agreements being left open for interpretation, particularly concerning the 
possibility of conflict between private interests and the regulatory tasks of public 
authorities, for example in cases where the adoption of legitimate legislation led to 
a state being condemned by international arbitrators for a breach of the principle of 
“fair and equitable treatment.”32 
The Parliament followed this critique with a mention of the fact that the US and Canada 
have changed their model BITs in response to such outcomes.33   
Of course, it is one thing to take note of existing problems and quite another to solve 
them.34  Many of the European Parliament’s concerns cannot properly be addressed 
without more systematic empirical analysis of the issues raised—which the Parliament’s 
Resolution decidedly lacks.  But based as they are upon anecdotal observations, the 
Parliament’s calls upon the Commission to review its intended policy direction in certain 
areas enjoy at least some empirical basis.  This stands in contrast to the Commission and 
Council documents to which it reacts.   
It is therefore regrettable that the Commission initially responded to the Parliament’s 
calls for further analysis of key issues in a dismissive manner.  Consider, for example, 
how the Commission went about taking “due note of the [Parliamentary] Resolution’s 
request for the establishment of clear definitions of investor protection standards, in 
order to prevent international arbitrators from broadly interpreting investor protection 
clauses.”35  After pompously asserting that “[a]ll these standards have been defined and 
 
29. Parliament – Resolution on a Future EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, paras. A-J. 
30. Id. at para. C. 
31. Id. at para. E. 
32. Id. at para. G (unfortunately, the document does not cite to any specific investor-state awards 
which raised particular concerns for the European Parliament). 
33. Id. at para. H. 
34. See Reinisch, Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2, at 142, for an example. He rightly expresses 
skepticism about the Parliament’s vague suggestion that the EU’s future investment treaties 
should somehow distinguish between speculative investment and other forms of investment. As 
risk-taking is inherent in all forms of investment activities, the Parliament would have to do a 
much better job of motivating its particular concerns before any informed decision concerning the 
EU’s future investment treaty definition of “investment” could be taken. 
35. European Commission, Follow up to the European Parliament Resolution on the future European 
international investment policy, at 4 (July 5, 2011) [hereinafter Commission – Follow up to the 
Parliament Resolution on the future European international investment policy], available at 
www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/spdoc.do?i=19829&j=0&l=en. 
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implemented by international tribunals and courts for many decades now – some even for 
centuries”,36 the Commission went on to assure the Parliament that the Commission 
“remains at its disposition for further explanations as to the content of specific standards 
that may raise concerns or uncertainty for the Parliament.”37  Such thinly veiled 
condescension seems unwarranted at best and intolerable at worst.  Even a cursory 
perusal of the Parliamentary Resolution reveals that Parliament’s concerns over vague 
investment treaty terms stem not from a lack of understanding of the applicable 
international legal standards but rather from a detailed knowledge of the widely varying 
and sometimes irreconcilable ways in which those standards have actually been applied 
by tribunals in practice.38   
In fact, as the Commission well knows, there is a large and ever-growing literature on 
the relationship between vague treaty terms and inconsistent decision-making by 
international tribunals.39  Scholars, arbitrators, NGOs, and intergovernmental 
organizations like UNCTAD have put forth no shortage of suggestions for how to address 
such inconsistency problems within international investment law.40  It would be very 
unfortunate indeed if the Commission, with the seeming encouragement of the Council,41 
were to barrel ahead in forging a new EU-wide approach to international investment 
treaties that retains all of the known pathologies of the Member States’ old ones without 
first engaging in at least some level of critical reflection.   
In certain areas, systematic empirical evidence is available to guide future investment 
policy-making.42  In other areas, anecdotal evidence may have to suffice.43  It seems 
incontrovertible, however, that evidence-free policymaking is likely to lead to suboptimal 
outcomes and should not be allowed to carry the day.  Instead, Europeans have a 
reasonable right to expect that all of the EU’s responsible organs will inform themselves 
 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 5. 
38. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005). 
39. On the flexibility of treaty interpretation more generally, see Gerald Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or 
Woe to the Negotiatiors! Your Treaty or Our “Interpretation” of It?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 358 (1971). 
40. Franck, supra note 39; Michael Waibel, International Investment Law and Treaty Interpretation, 
in FROM CLINICAL ISOLATION TO SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION, 29 (Rainer Hofmann, Christian J. Tams, 
eds., Baden-Baden 2011); UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, 
supra note 24, at 8; HOWARD MANN, ET AL., IISD MODEL INT’L AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT 
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: NEGOTIATORS’ HANDBOOK (IISD 2d ed. 2006) (2005), 
available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_handbook.pdf. 
41. See Council – Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 16 (instructing 
the Commission to essentially pursue investment treaties very much along the lines of the most 
investor-friendly of the Member States’ 1990s era BITs). 
42. See, e.g., supra note 25 and accompanying text (for a discussion on the relationship between 
investment treaties and investment flows). 
43. See Reinisch, Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2, at 139 (concerning the various ways in which 
investment arbitration tribunals have interpreted vague treaty standards in the past). 
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of both the positive and negative consequences of states’ past investment treaty-making 
practices before proceeding.  Then, armed with this improved knowledge, these organs 
bear a collective and individual duty to adjust plans for a future EU-wide international 
investment policy in accordance with the EU’s goals.  This brings us to the second set of 
considerations relevant to the present “where next?” query.  Namely, what exactly are 
the EU’s goals for its future international investment policy? 
B. A Question of Policy Goals 
Just as figuring out where along the investment path the EU presently stands 
requires EU institutions to engage in an empirical stocktaking exercise, figuring out 
where the EU should head next requires it to conduct a robust normative debate to 
clarify the end goals of a shared EU international investment policy.  On one level this 
may seem like a simple task.  There are, after all, several common themes that emerge 
from the relevant documents promulgated by the Parliament, Commission, and Council 
so far.  In brief, these are:    
• A commitment to creating a level playing field among investors from all EU Member 
States, both with respect to their intra-EU and extra-EU investment activities;44 
• A desire to create jobs, stimulate growth, and encourage sustainable economic 
development;45 and 
• A concern for preserving the right of the EU and its Member States to regulate in the 
public interest.46 
It is difficult to take issue with any of these goals in the abstract; but as is often the 
case, the devil is in the details.  Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that the Council 
is most interested in opening new markets to EU investors and increasing the level of 
legal protection enjoyed by EU investors abroad.47  The Parliament, by contrast, chiefly 
 
44. Id.  Many commentators have argued that the existing intra-EU BITs violate this 
fundamental principle by affording preferential treatment within parts of the EU internal 
market to some EU investors over others.  See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Document on 
the free movement of capital in the EU, at 11, SWD (2013) 146 final (May 15, 2013) (finding 
that “the Single Market for capital continues to be fragmented by existing Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) between certain Member States” and concluding that these BITs 
are contrary to EU law), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/capital/docs/reports/130415_market-monitoring-working-
document_en.pdf. 
45. See article 3(3) in the Consolidated TEU. Consolidated TEU, Consolidated TFEU, and EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, supra note 2, at 19. 
46. See, e.g., Parliament – Resolution on a Future EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, paras. 23-26 
(on protecting the right to regulate). See also e.g., Commission – Follow up to the Parliament 
Resolution on the future European international investment policy, supra note 35, at 5 (setting 
out the Commission’s stance on the right to regulate). 
47. This is evident in the fact that the Council’s statement devotes 12 of its 19 paragraphs (paras. 6-
16, and 18) to advocating specific ways in which the Commission should aggressively pursue these 
two objectives while mentioning the need to preserve the right to regulate in furtherance of other 
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desires that the new EU investment policy have a “positive impact on growth and jobs 
not only in the EU but also in developing countries.”48  To that end it calls on the 
Commission to “maintain asymmetry in the EU’s trading relations with developing 
countries”49—a goal that is clearly at odds with the Council’s objective of obtaining 
preferential market access and privileged protections for EU investors.   
In another major clash of goals, the Parliament aggressively seeks to protect “the right 
of parties to [any EU investment] agreement to regulate, inter alia, in the areas of 
protection of national security, the environment, public health, workers’ and consumers’ 
rights, industrial policy and cultural diversity.”50  The Council, on the other hand, 
prioritizes the overarching objectives in the inverse manner.  While stressing that the 
“European investment policy must continue to allow the EU and the Member States to 
adopt and enforce measures necessary to pursue public policy objectives”,51 it 
nevertheless insists that “the main focus… should continue to be effective and ambitious 
investment protection and market access.”52 
The Commission has made some effort to stake out a middle ground between these 
two extremes.  Its main policy communication asserts that, while the future EU 
investment policy should be comprehensive and common, this does not entail a “one-size-
fits-all model for investment agreements with 3rd countries.”53  In this respect the 
Commission’s position seems amenable to the Parliament’s objective of continuing the 
EU’s practice, in the trade realm, of extending special and differential treatment to 
developing countries.  However, by the same token, it appears to run counter to the spirit 
of the Council’s first set of leaked negotiating directives to the Commission,54 since these 
directives instruct the Commission to negotiate essentially identical investment 
agreements with Canada, India and Singapore – three countries which are clearly not at 
the same level of development.   
On other points, the Commission’s goals appear to be more closely aligned with the 
Council’s.  For example, it agrees with the Council’s assessment that “[t]he Union should 
follow the available best practices to ensure that no EU investor would be worse off 
[under any new EU investment treaty] than they would be under Member States’ 
 
public policy objectives only in non-committal terms in a single paragraph (para. 17). See Council 
– Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 8. 
48. Parliament – Resolution on a Future EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, para. J.7. See also id. at 
para. J.2 (seeking an investment policy which “promotes high-quality investments and makes a 
positive contribution to worldwide economic progress and sustainable development”). 
49. Parliament – Resolution on a Future EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, para. J.21. 
50. Id. at para. J.25. 
51. Council – Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, para. 17. 
52. Id. at para 16. 
53. Commission – Towards a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 3, at 6. 
54. Council – Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 16. 
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BITs.”55  Still, there is a difference between the two positions in that the Commission’s 
main objective is “to deliver better results as a Union than the results that have been or 
could have been obtained by Member States individually.”56  The Commission thus seeks 
to be “guided by the best available standards”57 previously developed by the Member 
States but evinces no intention to be constrained by them.58  The distinction is subtle but 
important. 
Overall, the question as to which policy goals the Commission will privilege over 
others remains an open one.  As noted above, the Commission’s initially dismissive 
response to the Parliament’s Resolution seemed to intimate that its ultimate priorities lie 
closer to those of the Council than to those of the Parliament.59  However, recent moves 
suggest that the Commission has yet to make up its mind on certain key objectives.60  
According to yet another leaked document, the Commission’s proposed recommendation 
for a Council decision concerning the Commission’s negotiating mandate in the upcoming 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) negotiations with 
the U.S. includes language designed to calm fears about excessive lawsuits challenging 
national legislation.61  The draft includes a statement that an “[i]nvestor-to-state dispute 
settlement mechanism should contain safeguards against frivolous claims,” and specifies 
 
55. Commission – Towards a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 3, at 11; cf. 
Council – Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 3, at ¶ 9 
(emphasis added) (relying upon article 351 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union to conclude that the Member States’ BITs “should continue to afford protection and 
legal security to investors till they are replaced by at least equally effective EU agreements.”). 
56. Council – Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 3, at 6. 
57. Id. (emphasis added). 
58. Of course, even identifying which of the Member States’ existing standards are the “best 
available” ones is problematic, given the considerable differences of opinion that exist across EU 
institutions and among Member States. 
59. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
60. See also European Commission, EU Investment Policy: State of Play, at the Civil Society Dialogue 
in Brussels, (Apr. 15, 2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150853.pdf 
(listing the “main concerns” of the European Commission, namely, “[l]egitimate public measures 
(e.g. environment protection) challenged by investors,” “[i]nsufficient transparency and 
predictability of ISDS,” and the “[c]hilling effect” on the right to regulate or insufficient policy 
space for States”)(internal quotation marks omitted). 
61. Presidency compromise proposal regarding the Commission's proposed Recommendation for a 
Council Decision authorizing the opening of negotiations on a comprehensive trade and 
investment agreement, called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, between 
the European Union and the United States of America (EU) No. DS 1353/1/13 REV 1 of 21 
May 2013, ¶ 22, available at 
http://www.s2bnetwork.org/fileadmin/dateien/downloads/21st_May_DS1353_13_REV1.pdf 
[hereinafter Leaked Draft - EU TTIP Negotiating Mandate]. For an early press report on the 
Leaked Draft – EU TTIP Negotiating Mandate, see Ethan Bilby, EXCLUSIVE – EU Wants to 
Exclude Utilities from US Trade Talks, REUTERS, May 21, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/21/eu-us-trade-idUSL6N0E20QA20130521 
[hereinafter Reuters - Exclusive].  
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that “[t]he inclusion of investment protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement 
will depend on whether a satisfactory solution meeting EU interests . . . is achieved.”62 
What are we then to make of the confusing range of objectives set forth by the Council, 
the Parliament, and the Commission?  For one thing, as Professor Reinisch points out, it 
is not yet entirely clear where the EU is heading with its investment policy.63  Given the 
dearth of evidentiary support in the articulation of all three institutions’ sets of policy 
goals,64  it is also not clear which positions deserve support over others.   Most 
importantly, the persistence of these significant disagreements and vacillations 
underscores that the EU has much more work to do in hammering out what its common 
policy goals in the international investment domain should be moving forward.   
At a minimum, a continued inter-institutional dialogue is called for – one that 
generates some mutually agreed means of either balancing or prioritizing among the 
three institutions’ competing policy visions.  Such a dialogue should ideally run its course 
in advance of any further negotiations with third states.  Otherwise, the Commission 
risks negotiating new investment agreements with third countries that either the 
Council or Parliament will veto65 or that will be subject to challenge before the CJEU.66  
Neither outcome would do much to contribute to the confidence of investors in the 
stability and predictability of EU investment law—a fact that could make the EU’s 
negotiating partners wary from the outset. 
The better course would be to make a serious attempt to narrow the goal gaps between 
the Parliament and the Council before continuing down the path of treaty negotiations 
with key trading partners.  This would entail some delay in the conclusion of new 
 
62. Leaked Draft – EU TTIP Negotiating Mandate, supra note 61, ¶ 21. 
63. Reinisch – Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2, at 121.  
64. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
65. The Council has the power to do this under Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, art. 207(4), 
placing investment on the list of agreements subject to a special unanimity requirement.  See 
Reinisch – Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2, at 114. The source of the Parliament’s power of 
veto is not as easy to locate. Art. 218(6)(a) of the TFEU specifies the circumstances in which 
the Parliament’s assent is required for international agreements. In particular, art. 
218(6)(a)(v) requires Parliament’s assent for “agreements covering fields to which either the 
ordinary legislative procedure applies, or the special legislative procedure where consent by 
the European Parliament is required.” However, it does not appear that the other provisions 
of the TFEU specifically make investment treaties subject to either the “ordinary legislative 
procedure” or the “special legislative procedure where consent by the European Parliament is 
required.  Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, art. 218(6)(a)(v). Even so, authoritative 
commentaries on the topic appear to accept that the Parliament now enjoys a veto power over 
future EU investment treaties, and the Commission and Council also appear to be proceeding 
on this basis.  See e.g. Rudolf Mögele, AEUV Art. 218, in VERTRAG ÜBER DIE EUROPÄISCHE 
UNION UND VERTRAGE ÜBER DIE ARBEITSWEISE DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION 2071 – 2080, ¶ 18 
and 40 (Rudolf Streinz ed., 2d ed. 2012) (relying on past practice to conclude that all 
commercial agreements of the Union fall under the Parliamentary consent requirement of 
TFEU art. 218(6)(a)(v)); ANGELOS DIMOPOULOS, EU FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW (2011), 133-
136 (reaching the same conclusion). 
66. This is possible under art. 218(11) of the Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, art. 218(11). 
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comprehensive trade and investment agreements with Canada, India, and Singapore—a 
prospect that prominent EU multinational companies will not relish. Yet a delayed deal 
with these states may well be preferable to no deal, or worse yet, a bad deal.  Conversely, 
a good deal could smooth the way for speedier negotiations in the much higher stakes 
and much more politically fraught Transatlantic Partnership and China-EU Investment 
Agreement talks that are to follow.67  Either way, the bottom line is that the process of 
forging a minimal level of policy consensus has never been easy in any area of the EU’s 
ever-expanding competence, yet it has proven essential to the forward march of European 
harmonization.  There is no reason to expect international investment policy to be the 
exception. 
C. A Question of Implementation 
Shifting the focus to challenges of implementation brings in yet another set of factors 
which support slowing the train a bit.  As should be evident from the preceding 
discussions, without an empirically grounded understanding of what the Member States’ 
investment policies have accomplished in the past and a deliberatively generated 
minimum consensus on what a new EU policy should achieve in the future, any attempt 
to implement anything at all on a Union-wide level becomes an exercise in shooting in 
the dark.  This is aptly illustrated by the ongoing debate over how legal responsibility 
and financial liability for investor-state arbitration claims should be divided between the 
EU and the affected Member State(s) in instances where such claims arise under future 
EU investment treaties. The Commission transmitted its proposed regulation on this 
topic to the Council and the Parliament in June of 2012.68   
Without getting into the particulars of the Commission’s proposal,69 it would seem 
difficult to conceive of a sensible means of apportioning important rights of legal defense 
 
67. Higher stakes because the TTIP deal would cover around “half of world economic output and a 
third of all trade.” Reuters – Exclusive, supra note 61. Therefore, investment flows between China 
and the EU are around $20 billion annually and rising. See Press Release, EU, Commission 
proposes to open negotiations for an investment agreement with China, IP/13/458 (May 23, 2013), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-458_en.htm). The negotiations are more politically 
fraught because each requires a deal between two of the world’s three largest economies and most 
politically powerful negotiating blocks. 
68. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing a Framework for Managing Financial Responsibility Linked to Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement Tribunals Established by International Agreements to which the European 
Union is Party, COM (2012) 335 final (June 21, 2012) [hereinafter Commission Proposal – 
Financial Responsibility], available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/june/tradoc_149567.pdf.  
69. Not surprisingly, the Commission Proposal – Financial Responsibility, would grant the 
Commission extremely broad authority to dictate the legal defense to be mounted in any 
arbitration proceedings, and to determine what portion of any ultimate liability finding should 
fall upon the Member State concerned. Id. 
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and significant financial liabilities among potential respondents without first knowing 
precisely what types of investor-state claims will be countenanced and what level of 
financial liability they may entail.  The attempt puts the proverbial cart before the horse.   
This point has not been lost on the European Parliament.  In May 2013, the 
Parliament adopted several amendments to the Commission’s proposed responsibility 
sharing regulation.70  Notable among these was a revised opening recital paragraph 
which states that not all future EU investment agreements should necessarily provide for 
investor-state arbitration.71  Rather, the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement 
provisions, in the Parliament’s assertion, “should be a conscious and informed policy 
choice that requires political and economic justification” and “should be decided for each 
International Investment Agreement in the light of the particular circumstances.”72  The 
Parliament went on to insert into the proposed regulation two new paragraphs designed 
to ensure that future EU investment agreements would: 
a)“[A]fford foreign investors the same high but no higher level of protection” than that 
which is afforded to European investors under “Union law and the general principles 
common to the laws of the Member States”;73 
b)Safeguard and not unduly constrain the Union’s legislative powers;74 and 
c)Be consistent with the CJEU’s rulings on the limited international liability of the 
Union for its legislative acts.75 
 
70. Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Framework for Managing Financial 
Responsibility Linked to Investor-state Dispute Settlement Tribunals Established by International 
Agreements to which the European Union is Party, A7-0124/2013 (Mar. 26, 2013) [hereinafter 
Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution – Managing Financial Responsibility in ISDS], 
available at  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-0124+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. Note that this website 
contains the Parliamentary documents relating to the plenary session of 26 March 2013 (Ordinary 
legislative procedure: first reading).  The proposed amendments it lists were, however, formally 
adopted by the Parliament in a Plenary sitting on 23 May 2013 (Ordinary legislative procedure: 
second reading). 
71. Id. amend. 3, recital 2, which reads: “[i]n the cases where it is justifiable, future investment 
protection agreements concluded by the Union can include an investor-to-state dispute 
settlement mechanism . . . .” (emphasis in original). The Parliament justified this amendment on 
the grounds that: 
[I]t is not a necessity to include ISDS provisions in future EU investment agreements 
and that their inclusion should be a conscious and informed policy choice that requires 
political and economic justification. Even if there is a general policy choice in favour, the 
question whether to include ISDS should be decided for each International Investment 
Agreement in the light of the particular circumstances.  
72. Id. 
73. Id. amend. 4, recital 3(a) (emphasis omitted). 
74. Id. amend. 5, recital 3(a). 
75. Id. (citing Joined Cases 120 & 121/06 P, FIAMM and Fedon v. Council and Commission, 2008 
E.C.R. I-6513) (noting that “[u]nless framed restrictively, EU investment treaties [could] thus allow 
arbitral tribunals to hold the Union liable to foreign investors for legislative acts where EU 
investors would have no claim under EU law” (emphasis in original). 
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 What is striking about these amendments is that they have nothing to do with the 
technicalities of dividing up legal and financial responsibilities between the EU and the 
Member States. The Parliament expressed only minor quibbles with the Commission’s 
proposed approach on that front.76  The Parliament instead devoted the bulk of its 
energies to resurrecting what it evidently regards as a prematurely stifled policy 
debate.77  This move is quite understandable under the circumstances, and one can only 
hope that the Commission and the Council will sit up and take notice.    
Of course, to highlight the Parliament’s ongoing hesitations is not to minimize the 
important preparatory work the Commission has already completed. There are many 
difficult implementation questions that must be addressed to allow the EU to move 
forward with adopting a comprehensive Union-wide investment policy.  What will 
become of the Member States’ existing BITs?  How much involvement will the Member 
States have in negotiations over the new BITs that are slated to replace the old ones?78  
How will the EU deal with the fact that the ICSID Convention welcomes only states, and 
not supranational organizations, as contracting parties?79  Even outside the ICSID 
context, how will legal and financial responsibility be handled when future investor-state 
arbitration claims arise?  The Commission itself has taken the lead in identifying these 
and many other complex challenges.  It deserves credit for deploying its formidable 
technical expertise to begin sorting through them, and I am confident that its efforts will 
eventually succeed.   
The larger point, however, is that since responsibility for European investment 
policymaking has shifted with the Lisbon Treaty, the implementation process must 
morph alongside it.  This requires stepping back to discern which technical problems can 
be addressed in advance of achieving an inter-institutional consensus on policy goals and 
which ones cannot.  It makes little sense to propose a technical regulation which, in 
effect, implements the policy vision of one institution when it is known in advance that a 
second institution with a conflicting policy vision must also provide its assent before the 
regulation can be adopted. On the other hand, asking the Commission to sit on its hands 
while the Parliament and the Council battle it out hardly seems ideal either.   
 
76. See, e.g., Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution – Managing Financial Responsibility 
in ISDS, supra note 70, amend. 6, recital 4; amend. 7, recital 6; amend. 9, recital 8; amend. 10, 
recital 10, etc. (all proposing only minor changes to the Commission’s text). 
77. Id. amends. 3-5, 8, 19, 24, 27, 28, 30, 32, 34, 35, 43 (all proposing major additions or changes to the 
Commission’s text). 
78. See Reinisch – Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2, at 117, 137 (discussing the idea of EU investment 
treaties as “mixed agreements” to be negotiated jointly by the Commission and the Member 
States).  
79. The EU’s recent experience with negotiating the accession of the Union to the European 
Convention on Human Rights can no doubt provide lessons on how to approach this problem.  
See PAUL GRAGL, THE ACCESSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2013). 
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The next section, therefore, considers what role each of the four major EU institutions 
can and should productively play in the process of creating and refining the Union’s new 
comprehensive international investment policy. 
II. Who Should Decide?  Four Voices, One Europe 
Deciding who should do what in a policymaking context is not only a question of legal 
competence but also of comparative advantage.  Each of the institutions that play a 
major part in shaping Europe’s future international investment policy bring different 
institutional strengths and weaknesses to the table.  These strengths and weaknesses 
should serve as signposts for working out how the new EU policy takes shape in practice.  
In discussing who should do what, I will follow a traditional legal ordering schema, 
moving from legislative to executive to judicial functions in sequence. 
A. Community-Wide Democratic Vetting in the European 
Parliament 
The European Parliament was singled out to be one of the clear winners under the 
Lisbon Treaty’s amendments to the Union’s institutional operating structure.80  Indeed, 
it is worth recalling that a major driver of the successful rounds of EU treaty reform over 
the past two decades has been a push to reduce the EU’s much-bemoaned democratic 
deficit.81  This makes it felicitous that the outcome of the Lisbon Treaty, insofar as it 
concerns foreign investment policy, is not only that that the EU has acquired the 
 
80. Among other things, the Lisbon Treaty augmented the Parliament’s powers by bringing more 
than 40 new fields under the co-decision procedure by which the Parliament and the Council now 
jointly exercise decision-making authority.  The Treaty also gives Parliament the final say on the 
EU budget.  As explained by European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek: 
The Treaty gives a huge boost to the powers of the European Parliament. The rise in 
legislative powers for the European Parliament represents almost a doubling in power.  
One key area of increased power is the Common Agricultural Policy.  MEPs for the first 
time will decide on agricultural expenditure hitherto almost exclusively controlled by 
national agricultural ministries.  Agricultural spending counts for almost 40% of the 
EU budget.  MEPs will also have an equal say with ministers on the way the EU's 
structural funds are shaped and spent.  Our European Parliament committees are 
responsible for nearly 100 percent of EU legislation, having great power in their hands. 
 Statement by EP President Jerzy Buzek on the Lisbon Treaty (Dec. 1, 2009), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/lisbon_treaty/statement_ep_president_EN.pdf. 
81. For an overview, see Giandomenico Majone, Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of 
Standards, 4 EUR. L.J. 5, 5-28 (1998); Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the ‘Democratic 
Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union, 40 J. OF COMMON MARKET STUD. 603, 
603-34 (2002); Andreas Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A 
Response to Majone and Moravcsik, 44 J. OF COMMON MARKET STUD. 533, 533-62 (2006); and 
Youri Devuyst, The European Union's Institutional Balance after the Treaty of Lisbon: 
“Community Method” and “Democratic Deficit” Reassessed”, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 247, 247-325 
(2008). 
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competence to craft an integrated EU-wide policy on behalf of its Member States, but also 
that the European Parliament now plays a significant role in shaping the new policy. 
As noted above, the Lisbon Treaty brought foreign direct investment within the scope 
of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP), which is subject to the so-called “ordinary 
legislative procedure.”82  The legal import of this change was that the Parliament and the 
Council must henceforth act jointly in adopting the EU’s future investment treaties and 
in enacting the internal regulatory framework which will govern their implementation 
within the Union.83  Considering comparative institutional strengths, it is evident that 
the Parliament and the Council have different roles to play in exercising this shared 
competence.   
Citizens within EU Member States directly elect members of the European 
Parliament.84  Their principal task is to represent the interests of their constituencies in 
the enactment of EU-wide legislation.85  In the realm of investment, the European 
Parliament functions as a democratic deliberative body which ensures that the various 
policy concerns voiced by its constituencies in respect of Member States’ past investment 
policies are addressed in any new EU-wide policy.  So far, the Parliament appears to be 
taking its expanded representative responsibilities in this area quite seriously.  This is 
evident from the above discussion of the Parliament’s recent amendments to the 
Commission’s proposed regulation on managing the financial responsibility of the Union 
and the Member States under future EU investment treaties. 
Given that the Parliament’s very purpose is to protect the interests of EU citizens, it is 
puzzling that some commentators within the investment arbitration community appear 
to view the Parliament’s active efforts to shape the new EU investment policy as 
somehow inappropriate or obstructionist.86  Hopefully, this sentiment will wane with 
time as the relevant actors become more accustomed to Parliamentary involvement in 
this area of the EU’s external relations.87   
 
82. See Reinisch – Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2, at n.139.  
83. For the legal basis of the Parliament’s powers, see id. at 114-18 (discussing the combined impact of 
arts 207(1), 207(2), 207(4), and 218(6)(a)(v) on the legal competence of the Parliament and the 
Council, respectively, in the area of foreign direct investment).  
84. See article 14(3) of the Consolidated TEU. Consolidated TEU, Consolidated TFEU, and EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 2, at 24-25. See also Consolidated TFEU, supra note 
2, art. 223(1).  
85. The Parliament thus serves a function similar to that of the House of Representatives in the U.S. 
domestic lawmaking context. 
86. OGEMID subscribers will recall that the above-discussed Parliamentary amendments to the 
Commission’s proposed financial responsibility regulation (see discussion infra Part I.C.) were 
greeted with scathing criticism by many members of the OGEMID community.  For those who are 
not familiar with it, OGEMID is the principle electronic listserve followed by the community of 
investment arbitration practitioners and scholars.  Since OGEMID operates under the Chatham 
House Rule, I cannot quote any of the specific comments here. 
87. To the extent that the objection is that Parliament is insufficiently informed about the relevant 
issues, the better approach would be to take direct action to educate Parliamentarians and 
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In my own view, the Parliament’s strong push for a re-evaluation of some of the 
international investment regime’s central articles of faith should be welcomed with open 
arms.  Whether or not one agrees with any of its specific reform proposals, the 
Parliament’s refusal to rubber stamp and simply transpose to the EU level the past 
bilateral investment treaty practices of certain influential Member States has generated 
positive results.  It has opened up space for a genuine and much needed dialogue about 
the goals of international investment policy and a critical appraisal of the successes and 
failures of past efforts.  The Parliament’s cautious approach thus deserves praise rather 
than condemnation.  Apart from approbation considerations, what seems unarguable are 
that the European Parliament understands both its powers and its duties in the new EU 
investment policy-making arena.  EU citizens may take heart in observing that the 
Parliament so far appears committed to doing its job. 
B. Member State Checks and Balances at the Council of the 
European Union 
Turning to the Council, can the same generally positive assessment be made of the 
Council’s efforts to-date in considering its institutional strengths?  As explained on its 
website, “[t]he Council is the EU institution where the Member States’ government 
representatives sit, i.e. the ministers of each Member State with responsibility for a 
given area.”88  The Council’s remit includes the authority to adopt “legislative acts 
(Regulations, Directives, etc.), in many cases [including international investment policy] 
in ‘co-decision’ with the European Parliament.”89  The EU treaties establish the number 
of votes each Member State can cast within the Council.90  They also determine the 
 
thereby do away with any knowledge deficit.  For an example of such productive engagement, see 
Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Managing financial responsibility for investor claims under EU investment 
agreements: Comments on the Commission proposal for a Regulation – COM(2012) 335 final1 and 
Professor Tietje’s study on the draft Regulation (Dec. 2012) (working paper) [hereinafter 
“Kleinheisterkamp – Comments on Managing Financial Responsibility”], available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2222580.  
88. WEBSITE OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/council?lang=en (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (Note that the Council 
of the European Union is designated in short form in the EU treaties as “the Council.”  There is 
also a separate body called “the European Council” which the treaties always refer to by its full 
name.  This latter body is comprised of the Member States’ sitting heads of state and is 
responsible for setting the general policy direction of the Union.  Unlike the Council, however, it 
does not exercise any direct legislative authority.) 
89. Id. 
90. Loosely speaking, the formula allocates more votes to Member States with larger populations, but 
the correspondence is not straightforward.  The economic and political prominence of certain 
Member States and their historical role within the Union are also taken into account.  Hence Italy 
and Germany each receive 29 votes (even though Germany’s population exceeds Italy’s by 22 
million), but Spain (whose population lags that of Italy by less than 13 million) receives only 27 
votes. Id. 
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circumstances in which the Council may act by simple majority as opposed to when it 
must act by qualified majority or unanimity.91  When it comes to adopting an EU-wide 
international investment policy, the unanimity requirement applies.92 
Unlike Members of the European Parliament, Council Members are not directly 
elected by citizens, but are instead appointed to the Council by their respective home 
state governments.93  Their democratic mandate is thus further removed from the 
electorate than is the case with the European Parliament.94  The Council does, 
nevertheless, enjoy two comparative institutional advantages over the Parliament when 
it comes to international investment policy-making.   
The first is subject matter-specific diplomatic expertise at the intergovernmental level.  
Unlike Council Members, members of the European Parliament are legislative 
generalists.  Their mandate is to forge a pan-European regulatory consensus that will 
prove acceptable to their constituents on matters ranging from immigration to 
agricultural policy.  The Council, by contrast, sits in “configurations” organized by subject 
matter.95  Council decisions concerning international investment policy are led by 
executive branch officials from the Member States who sit together within the Foreign 
Affairs Configuration, and specifically, by high level officials sitting within the Trade 
Policy Committee (Services and Investment).96  These officials bring to the Committee a 
considerable level of collective diplomatic expertise in negotiating international 
 
91. The basic functions of the Council are set forth in article 16 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), while the manner in which the Council goes about fulfilling its functions is specified in 
articles 237 to 243 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
Consolidated TEU, Consolidated TFEU, and EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 
2, at 26; Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, art. 237-243. Article 3 of Protocol 36 (on 
Transitional Provisions) specifies the current voting rights allocations exercised by the 
Member States within the Council.  Consolidated TEU, Consolidated TFEU, and EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, supra note 2, at, 325-326. This number ranges from 3 votes on the low 
end (Malta) to 29 on the high end (Germany, France, Italy, and UK).  
92. Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, art. 207(4). 
93. See article 16(2) of the Consolidated TEU. Consolidated TEU, Consolidated TFEU, and EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 2, at 26. 
94. Of course, national governments are directly elected by citizens in all EU Member States, and 
it is these governments which appoint their executive branch Ministers to serve on the 
Council. In this sense, the individual Council Members enjoy a certain degree of democratic 
legitimacy as representatives of their countries’ elected governments. The democratic 
legitimacy of the Council as a whole is nevertheless limited by the fact that its members are 
not directly elected to represent their countries in a generalized EU-wide legislative role, but 
are rather appointed to ministerial posts in their home states and then seconded to the 
Council for specific purposes. 
95. See article 16(6) of the Consolidated TEU. Consolidated TEU, Consolidated TFEU, and EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 2, at 26; Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, art. 236. 
96. Information about the Council’s Committee Structure may typically be found on the website of 
the Presidency of the Council, which rotates to a different Member State every six months.  At 
the time of this writing, the Council presidency was held by Ireland.  The Council’s committee 
structure for January through June of 2013 is available at http://eu2013.ie/ireland-and-the-
presidency/abouttheeu/theeuexplained/councilworkingparties/. 
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investment law and policy.97  As a result, they may be better placed than many 
Parliamentarians to set realistic policy boundaries within which the Commission can 
conclude successful treaty negotiations. 
The Council’s second institutional strength in this realm is its unique ability to 
safeguard the interests of individual Member States against any potential “tyranny of 
the majority.”  While a simple majority takes Parliamentary decisions concerning EU 
investment policy, the TFEU imposes the special unanimity requirement upon all 
Council decisions taken within this area.  Stronger, larger, and more historically 
influential states within the EU are thereby prohibited – at least in theory – from riding 
roughshod over the wishes of weaker, smaller, or newer Member States.   
In light of these two institutional strengths, it seems pertinent to ask how the Council 
might go about capitalizing on its comparative advantages in its role as co-legislator 
overseeing the development of the EU’s future comprehensive international investment 
policy.  
With respect to the latter strength, the equalizing effect of the Council’s special 
unanimity requirement has important implications given the Member States’ different 
experiences with past investment treaty practices.  The Member States which, prior to 
the passage of the Lisbon Treaty, entered into the largest numbers of bilateral 
investment treaties were:  Germany, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, 
Belgium/Luxembourg, and Italy.98  This list contains all of the founding members of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).99  It also includes all of the EU’s present 
day economic powerhouse states save Spain.  Yet the list has almost no overlap with the 
list of EU countries that have faced serious investor-state arbitration claims under BITs.  
Germany and Belgium are only now facing their first colorable investor-state claims,100 
while the other founding countries have yet to face any.101   
 
97. The Parliament also develops substantial subject-matter expertise through its committee 
structure.  In the investment realm, the Committee on International Trade (known as INTA) is 
the dominant player.  Nevertheless, the expertise advantage I highlight here is diplomatic.  
Consistent with their legislative function, most members of INTA will take a legislative/regulatory 
view of international investment law (the advantages of which were highlighted in the previous 
section).  In contrast, many of the executive branch ministers who serve on the Council’s Trade 
Policy Committee (Services and Investment) have participated in inter-governmental negotiations 
over international investment agreements on behalf of their home countries and/or have been 
involved in responding to investor-state legal claims lodged under such agreements.  This imbues 
them with an inevitably different, though ideally complementary, viewpoint. 
98. Commission – Towards a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 3, at 12 (Annex). 
99. The ECSC was established in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris, to which West Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy were party.  See Treaty Establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community, 18 April 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, entered into force 23 July 1952.  
Expired 23 July 2002. 
100.  See Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12 
(award pending) (Sept. 27, 2013); Vattenfall Launches Second Claim Against Germany, GLOB. 
ARB. REV. (June 25, 2012), available at 
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By contrast, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia have all had to respond to multiple claims by 
foreign investors, some of which have led to large damages awards against them.102  One 
might expect these very different experiences with investor-state dispute settlement to 
lead Member States to adopt different positions within the Council when it comes to the 
EU’s future international investment policy.   
For example, there is good reason to suppose that the Czech Republic, which has 
already faced 20 investor-state arbitration claims, may wish the Council to be more 
specific in its policy communications than simply stating that the EU’s new policy should 
“continue to allow the EU and the Member States to adopt and enforce measures 
necessary to pursue public policy objectives.”103  Such a general statement sheds little 
light on the most pressing challenge that the Commission will face when negotiating 
with other countries.  That is, how, precisely, should public policy prerogatives be better 
protected in future EU agreements with third states?  In light of their wealth of 
experience responding to investor-state claims triggered by public policy measures, Czech 
officials might be thought to have developed strong views on the matter. Moreover, given 
their government’s effective right of veto over Council decisions in this area, one might 
expect to see the Czech Republic’s representatives flex their muscles a bit more here than 
in other matters. The same goes for the other Member States with experience in 
responding to investor-state claims. 
Yet surprisingly, there appears to have been little concerted debate surrounding this 
or other controversial issues within the Council so far.   To the contrary, nothing in the 
Council’s conclusions on the Commission’s original investment policy proposal,104 or in its 
first set of leaked negotiating directives to the Commission,105 evinces any kind of 
dissension within the Council’s ranks.  Council Members instead seem to have united 
around a common mission of securing “effective and ambitious investment protection and 
market access”106 for EU investors.107  The intriguing question is, why? 
 
http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/30634/vattenfall-launches-second-claim-
against-germany/; Alyx Barker, Belgium Faces Claim from Chinese Investors, GLOB. ARB. REV. 
NEWS (Sept. 24, 2012), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/b/30840/.   
101.  According to UNTAD, claims have also been lodged against the UK, France, Italy, and Spain.  
However, it is doubtful whether any of these claims were remotely colorable, as there is no 
publicly available information to suggest that any of them ever reached the stage of the 
constitution of an actual arbitral tribunal.  See UNCTAD, Recent Developments in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS), IIA Issues Note, No. 1 (May 2013), Annex 2 (“Known Investment 
treaty claims, by respondents”).   
102.  Id. 
103. Council - Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, para.17. 
104. Id. 
105. Council - Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 16. 
106. Council - Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, para.16. See also 
Council - Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 16 (instructing the 
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One answer may be that the Council simply trusts the Commission to hammer out the 
details in an appropriate manner.  This explanation could dovetail with the first of the 
Council’s two comparative institutional strengths.  That is, perhaps, in light of their 
diplomatic expertise, the Council Members think it better not to hamstring the 
Commission in advance with too detailed a policy agenda or too constrictive a negotiating 
mandate.  But if preserving the Commission’s negotiating flexibility is truly the goal, the 
Council is pursuing its aim rather selectively.  After all, it did instruct the Commission to 
make eight specific, BIT-derived investor protection standards – backed by investor-state 
dispute settlement mechanisms – “the main pillars of future EU investment 
agreements.”108 
A second possible explanation is less generous but perhaps more probable.  It is often 
the case that an institution’s relative strengths also entail relative weaknesses.  Here, 
the Trade Policy Committee’s specialized knowledge could act as a double-edged sword.  
It could encourage myopic decision-making processes that pursue investor protection 
goals to the exclusion of competing policy considerations.  This potential institutional 
weakness is structurally mitigated within the Council by the fact that all final decisions 
are vetted and adopted by the Committee of Permanent Representatives.109  Unlike the 
Trade Policy Committee, this Committee is comprised of the Member States’ permanent 
ambassadors to the EU, who are accountable not to their respective countries’ trade 
ministers but to their heads of government. 
In practice, however, the degree to which final Council decisions prioritize trade and 
investment issues versus competing policy concerns may depend upon the level of 
influence exerted upon each Member State’s home government by the pro-trade and pro-
investment lobbies relative to other powerful lobbies, such as workers’ unions, human 
rights advocates, environmental organizations, and the like.  If public choice theorists are 
correct in suggesting that significant power differentials exist across the two types of 
lobbies,110 this could help explain why the Council has so far placed a strong emphasis on 
 
Commission to aim to include eight specific investor protection standards, backed by investor-
state arbitration). 
107. In respect of the Leaked Draft – EU TTIP Negotiating Mandate, supra note 61, it is noteworthy 
that all of the language providing greater protection for public policy regulations enacted by the 
EU and its Member States was proposed by the Commission, not by the Council’s Trade Policy 
Committee.  As of this writing, it appears that the Presidency of the Council has not recommended 
that this language be struck from the Council’s final negotiating directives to the Commission, but 
it remains to be seen what the full Council will make of the proposed draft when it meets to 
consider the matter. 
108. Council – Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, para. 14. 
109. This Committee is known as COREPER II.  For a basic description of the Committee and its 
functions, see Coreper II, EUROPEAN UNION NEWSROOM, 
http://europa.eu/newsroom/calendar/event/291099/coreper-ii.  
110. Some classic works include: Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for 
Political Influence, 98(3) Q.J. OF ECON. 371-400 (1983); Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of 
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pushing detailed investor protection standards while generating only vague nods in the 
direction of preserving governmental regulatory space.111   
The EU investment policy saga could yet hold a surprising twist in store for its 
followers at the Council level, though.  This is because lobby-based power dynamics often 
generate unconventional outcomes in institutional environments requiring unanimous 
decision-making.112  While fans of the Council’s current policy direction must maintain 
the support of 27 Member States in order to continue the present inertia, opponents need 
only convince a single Member State to shift course in some material way in order to 
force a Council-wide re-alignment.113   The situation calls to mind the experience of the 
OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment.114  In the mid-1990s, its eventual adoption 
seemed all but assured by the overwhelming support of the business community and the 
strong commitment of the negotiating governments.  But in the end, the entire 
agreement unraveled after a successful civil society campaign convinced France to 
withdraw its support.115   
What this analysis suggests is that it is still too early to conclude that the Council will 
remain steadfast on its present course in forging the EU’s comprehensive international 
investment policy.  Potential veto threats emanating from the European Parliament and 
perhaps, in future, from within the Council itself may well force the Council to make 
 
the Rent-Seeking Society, 64(3) AM. ECON. REV. 291-303 (1974); James M. Buchanan, The Domain 
of Constitutional Economics, 1(1) CONST. POL. ECON. 1-18 (1990); Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Directly 
Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities, 90(5) J. OF POL. ECON. 988-1002 (1982). 
111. An ancillary to this explanation is that stronger states may be able to put various kinds of 
pressure on weaker states to go along with a particular policy.  Thus, to the extent that a lobby 
can successfully get the governments of the stronger states on board with its preferred policies, it 
may not have to lobby the weaker governments directly. 
112. This has been the source of much debate within the WTO, with commentators fearing that the 
Doha Development Round of negotiations may never reach a conclusion if the WTO’s “single 
undertaking” principle and its consensus-based decision-making norm are retained.  See, e.g. Joost 
Pauwelyn, New Trade Politics for the 21st Century, 11 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 559 – 573 (2008); and 
Richard Baldwin, 21st Century Regionalism: Filling the Gap between 21st Century Trade and 20th 
Century Trade Rules (CEPR Policy Insights No. 56 Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-08, May 
2011), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201108_e.pdf. 
113. Indeed, I would be surprised if savvy civil society organizations weren’t either already making or 
preparing to make concerted efforts to influence the voting patterns of one or two Member State 
governments within the Council.  In light of all of the public reporting on investor-state 
arbitration claims, identifying which Member States are particularly vulnerable to civil society 
lobbying efforts and which officials within those governments are most likely to lend a 
sympathetic ear is not a difficult task. 
114. The OECD maintains a website repository of the documentation related to the negotiations, see 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Documentation from the Negotiations, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/index.htm.  
115. For a brief history of the episode, see Katia Tieleman, The Failure of the Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment (MAI) and the Absence of a Global Public Policy Network (2005) (unpublished 
manuscript) (On file with UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks), available at 
http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/Tieleman_MAI_GPP_Network.pdf. 
12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (2013) 
208 
some concessions.  But there is no reason why the Council need await the materialization 
of such threats before acting.   
Instead, when crafting its next round of policy statements and negotiating directives 
for the Commission, the Council can and should take concrete steps to explicitly address 
the major criticisms that have been leveled against some of the Member States’ past 
investment treaty practices.  These criticisms are well known.116  It is therefore 
reasonable to expect the Council to engage with them at the same level of specificity as in 
its pronouncements concerning investor protection standards.  In doing so, the Council 
can put to good use the considerable diplomatic expertise of its Trade Policy Committee 
and the numerous investor-state dispute resolution experiences of some of its Member 
States.  This, in turn, promises to generate more feasible ways of making necessary 
adjustments to the EU’s future investment treaty-making practices than might otherwise 
emerge from Parliamentary proposals alone.   
Let us hope that the Council will rise to the challenge.  If it does, the EU’s new 
comprehensive international investment policy stands a good chance of outperforming 
the past policies of the individual Member States – which was, after all, the main reason 
behind the decision to transfer competency over investment policy to the EU in the first 
place.  At a more fundamental level, the international investment arena affords the 
Member States a critical opportunity to contribute, through the Council, to the 
maturation of the European Union.  By fully embracing its new post-Lisbon Treaty role 
as co-legislator with the Parliament, the Council can reaffirm its commitment not only to 
European cooperation, but also to European democracy. 
C. Executive Coordination Through the European Commission 
Moving next to the European Commission, what light can its comparative 
institutional strengths shed on the role it ought to play in the forging of the new EU 
comprehensive investment policy?  First, a few words about the structure of the 
Commission are in order.  The Commission is comprised at its highest level by 27 
Commissioners who are appointed (one by each Member State) to sit in the College of 
Commissioners.  At the outset of his or her term, the President of the Commission117 
 
116. For a comprehensive discussion of the various critiques and some proposed solutions, see Issues in 
International Investment Agreements:  Key Issues, vols. I-III (UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/10) (Dec. 1, 
2004, May 17, 2005, and June 30, 2005, respectively), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/publications/Intl-Investment-Agreements---Issue-Series-I.aspx.   See 
also MICHAEL WAIBEL ET AL., THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS 
AND REALITY (2010). 
117. The President is nominated by the European Council (that is, the heads of all of the Member State 
governments) acting by a qualified majority.  He or she must then be formally elected to office by 
the European Parliament acting by an absolute majority.  Each President serves a five-year term, 
and may be re-elected to a second term.  For details, see article 17(7) of the Consolidated TEU. 
Consolidated TEU, Consolidated TFEU, and EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 2, at 
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assigns specific portfolios to each Commissioner.  These portfolios reflect the areas in 
which the EU is competent to act on behalf of the Member States.  The individual 
Commissioners then take responsibility for directing the Commission’s activities in 
particular subject matter areas such as trade, agriculture, and energy.118 
Like members of the Council, their home governments initially nominate the 
Commissioners.  Unlike the Council, however, the Commission serves a fixed five-year 
term so that its composition does not fluctuate along with national election results in 
each Member State.119  The fixed term helps to secure the Commissioners in their 
mandate to serve the Union as a whole rather than the interests of their home states.  In 
addition, the European Parliament must approve the makeup of the entire Commission – 
including the portfolio assignments made by the President – before it can take office.120  
The Commission’s Director-General of Trade (who now oversees investment policy as 
well) is therefore vetted by the Parliament’s Committee on International Trade before 
being voted into office by a majority of the full Parliament.121  The democratic 
imprimatur which the Commission receives from the Parliamentary confirmation process 
is important, since the Commission exercises extensive powers under the EU treaties.   
In terms of its functions within the investment domain in particular, the Commission 
enjoys the exclusive right to initiate EU legislation regulating cross-border 
investments.122  This power is best understood as quasi-legislative in that the 
Commission cannot actually adopt any legislation on its own – such power being reserved 
to the Parliament and the Council as co-legislators.123  The Commission’s other 
investment-related powers are executive in nature.  It is tasked with negotiating 
investment treaties with third states,124 implementing and overseeing the enforcement of 
 
28. 
118. A list of the Commission’s departments (Directorates-General) and services may be found at: 
Departments (Directorates-General) and Services, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/about/ds_en.htm.  
119. Also unlike Council members, Commissioners are appointed to act on behalf of the Union rather 
than on behalf of their home states.  They are therefore required to be “completely independent” 
and may “neither seek nor take instructions from any Government or other institution, body, 
office or entity.” See article 17(3) of the Consolidated TEU. Id. at 27. 
120. The Parliament also has the power to dissolve the Commission through an extraordinary vote on a 
motion of censure. See article 17(8) of the Consolidated TEU. Id. at 28. 
121. The Parliament must vote on the proposed Commission as a whole and may not reject individual 
Commissioners. See paragraph 3 of article 17(7) of the Consolidated TEU. Id. However, in 
practice, when there are strong objections to a particular candidate, the President will either 
reshuffle the proposed portfolio assignments or ask the relevant Member State to nominate a 
different Commissioner in place of the objectionable one. This ensures that Parliamentary 
approval of the entire Commission is not held up over a single candidate. 
122. Indeed, the Commission has exclusive authority to propose legislation in most areas of the EU’s 
competence.  This power, known as the right of initiative, emanates from art. 17(2), Consolidated 
TEU. Id. at 27. 
123. See infra Parts II.A & B. 
124. Upon authorization from the Council.  See Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, art 218(1)-(4). 
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the Union’s investment regulations and treaty obligations,125 and defending the Union in 
any legal disputes brought against it in consequence of such regulations and treaty 
obligations.126 
These structural features, duties, and powers suggest a couple of comparative 
institutional strengths upon which the Commission can draw in developing the EU’s new 
comprehensive international investment policy.   First, the Commission possesses an 
unparalleled level of technical expertise when it comes to negotiating and implementing 
pan-European economic treaties – principally trade agreements.127  It has likewise 
accumulated a wealth of experience in defending against state-to-state claims before the 
WTO.128  While international investment law and policy present distinctive challenges 
that are absent from the trade context (the possibility of investor-state claims being 
paramount among them), the Commission’s extensive experience with the latter 
nonetheless gives it significant insight into the former.   
Second, the Commission has been building up its investment expertise for some years 
through its direct involvement in several areas of investment policymaking.  In 
particular, it has: 
• Spoken for the EU in its status as a party to the Energy Charter Treaty;129  
• Successfully130 and unsuccessfully131 challenged portions of certain Member 
States’ BITs before the CJEU;  
• Submitted amicus curiae briefs to arbitration tribunals presiding over BIT-based 
investor-state claims against Member States;132 
• Represented the EU in investment-related negotiations within the WTO;133 and 
 
125. Consolidated TEU, Consolidated TFEU, and EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 
2, at 27. 
126. The details of this role are still being worked out.  See supra, notes 68-77 and accompanying text. 
127. See The EU’s Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreements—Where Are We? (Oct. 18, 2013), 
available at   http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/november/tradoc_150129.pdf (listing 28 
trade agreements already in place, plus more than a dozen ongoing and two upcoming sets of 
negotiations).  
128. A listing of all WTO cases in which the EC has acted as complainant, respondent, or third party 
may be found at: WTO Cases Involving the EU, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/wtodispute/search.cfm?code=1. 
129. Note that this treaty contains investor protection standards similar to most BITs and permits 
investors to file arbitration claims against parties who violate those standards.  See Energy 
Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 360, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100 [hereinafter ECT]. 
130. Case C-205/06, Comm’n v. Austria, 2009 E.C.R. I-1301; Case C-249/06, Comm’n v. Kingdom of 
Sweden, 2009 E.C.R. I-1335; Case C-118/07, Comm’n v. Finland, 2009 E.C.R. I-10889. 
131. Case C-264/09, Comm’n v. Slovak Republic, 2011 E.C.R. I-08065. 
132. The Commission has not made its amicus submissions publicly available, but media outlets have 
reported on several of them.  See, e.g. Luke Eric Peterson, European Commission Seeks to 
Intervene as Amicus Curiae in ICSID Arbitrations to Argue that Long-term Power Purchase 
Agreements Between Hungary and Foreign Investors are Contrary to European Community Law, 
INV. ARB. REP., Sept. 17, 2008, at 14.  
133. Such as discussions surrounding the Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) agreement. 
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• Participated as an observer in the investment policymaking and standard-setting 
activities of several other intergovernmental bodies.134 
This broad exposure, in combination with its deep expertise in the trade realm, makes 
the Commission better placed than any other EU institution to engineer the smooth 
functional integration of the EU’s future trade and investment policies.  The 
Commission’s new competence to negotiate both types of treaties arrives not a moment 
too soon.  While most international investment issues still remain outside the formal 
ambit of the WTO, there is an undeniable and accelerating worldwide trend toward 
concluding integrated regional trade and investment agreements.135   
The Commission’s nearly two decades of experience with trade negotiations gives it a 
clear informational advantage in this environment.  Thanks to its familiarity with the 
policy preferences and negotiating strategies of its trading partners, the Commission is 
in a better position than either the Council or the Parliament to assess how investment 
and trade provisions can and cannot (and should and should not) be linked within the 
next generation of hybrid agreements.  It also knows more about what the EU’s 
negotiating partners are and are not likely to accept in terms of trade-offs between 
investment and trade concessions.  Now that the EU is able to put both topics on the 
table simultaneously, the Commission can play a productive role in anticipating and 
proposing concrete ways in which each might best be played off against the other. 
Beyond just contributing its technocratic expertise at the level of negotiations and 
implementation, however, the Commission has a vital role to play in shaping the 
normative orientation of the EU’s comprehensive international investment policy.  
Thanks to its legislative right of initiative, the Commission enjoys a first-mover 
advantage in setting the terms of the policy debate.  It has already thrice made use of 
this advantage:  first, in communicating to the Parliament and the Council a proposed 
 
134. For example, the Commission represents the EU as an observer before investment-related bodies 
such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) (which 
recently adopted new transparency requirements for future investor-state arbitrations conducted 
under the revised UNCITRAL rules) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) (which analyzes the investment law and policy practices of its members 
and makes recommendations for “best practices”). 
135. The trend began in the 1990s with the conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) – a model that has since been replicated across several other regional trading blocs.  Its 
newest manifestations may be seen in the negotiations toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPPA) (see current status of the negotiations at: Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/tpp (last updated 
Sept. 23, 2013)) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) (see 
announcement of impending negotiations at: Fact Sheet: United States to Negotiate Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union,  OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2013/february/US-
EU-TTIP (last visited Feb. 13, 2013)).   As noted above (supra note 16), the EU is meanwhile 
working to conclude comprehensive trade and investment agreements with Canada, India, and 
Singapore. 
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framework for the new EU investment policy;136 second, in its proposed regulation on 
transitional arrangements for Member States’ BITs with third states (since adopted);137 
and third, in its proposed regulation on managing financial responsibility linked to 
investor-state dispute settlement.138   
The first mover advantage gives the Commission a unique opportunity to lead, rather 
than follow, by contributing innovative ideas to the policy discussion.  The Commission is 
nevertheless constrained in pressing this advantage by its position as middleman 
between the Council and the Parliament.139  Unfortunately, the above discussion of the 
Parliament’s strong pushback against the Commission’s proposed financial responsibility 
regulation suggests that the Commission has not always been sufficiently mindful of this 
go-between role.  The Commission’s lackluster policy framework document likewise 
evinced a distinct lack of creativity in applying its mind to the coordination task.140 
Moving forward, the Commission should devote less of its immediate attention to 
promulgating technical regulations and a great deal more to pondering what kinds of 
new investment regulations and investment treaty provisions actually stand a good 
chance of finding favor with both the Council and the Parliament.  There is no way of 
getting around this central challenge.  If any progress is to be made, it falls to the 
Commission to close the distance between the two institutions’ competing policy visions.  
This can only be done if the Commission proves willing to go out on a limb and propose 
innovative ways of responding to the Parliament’s major regulatory concerns while also 
satisfying the Council’s aggressive investor protection objectives. 
Before moving on to the final section, it is worth pausing to consider why the 
Commission has not yet proven more proactive on the innovation front.  One might have 
expected a greater show of problem-solving initiative, given the Commission’s vast treaty 
negotiating expertise and its unenviable institutional positioning between the Council’s 
Scylla and the Parliament’s Charybdis.  One explanation may lie in the Commission’s 
desire to avoid what has lately become known as “NAFTA contagion.”  This refers to the 
U.S. and Canadian-led phenomenon of concluding ever more detailed investment treaties 
which – while considerably longer and more difficult to negotiate than their predecessors 
– do little to clarify the actual content of states’ obligations toward foreign investors.141   
 
136. See discussion supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
137. EU Regulation establishing transitional arrangements, supra note 13. 
138. Discussed supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
139. As Article 17(1) of the Consolidated TEU, puts it, one of the Commission’s principal functions is to 
“exercise coordinating, executive, and management functions.”)  Consolidated TEU, Consolidated 
TFEU, and EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 2, at 27. 
140. See discussion supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
141. For allusions to this phenomenon, see, e.g., Kleinheisterkamp – Managing Financial 
Responsibility, supra note 87, para. 38 (criticizing the Commission for distancing itself from the 
NAFTA practice of tying the FET standard to customary international law but without providing 
a workable alternative way to clarify the content of the standard); and “Opinion of the European 
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To the extent that the much criticized North American solutions are indeed inspiring 
the Commission’s reticence, one can but sympathize.142  What is less apparent, however, 
is why the Commission should regard itself as limited by the previous innovations of 
others.  The U.S. and Canada may be somewhat trapped on their present trajectories by 
mechanisms like path dependency, vested interests, the impact of MFN clauses included 
in past treaties, and other constraints.  But the Commission has a one-time opportunity 
to sweep aside the past and chart an entirely new path for European international 
investment law and policy.  It would be a shame to see it waste the rare gift of a blank 
slate by needlessly limiting itself to coloring within some imaginary North American 
lines.  Hopefully, the Commission’s Members will instead recognize that a renewed round 
of policy innovation is both possible and called for, and that the Commission is in the 
prime position to drive it.143 
D. Safeguarding of EU Law by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union 
Last but not least, it is necessary to consider what role the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU)144 might play in the evolving EU international investment 
policy story.  Professor Reinisch has suggested that the CJEU will have the final word on 
some of the most controversial questions surrounding the scope and functioning of the 
new policy.145  In particular, he predicts that the Court will at some point be called upon 
to decide: 
• Whether the EU is competent to conclude investment treaties with third states 
covering both foreign direct investment and portfolio investment (or whether such 
treaties must instead be concluded as “mixed agreements” by the EU and its Member 
States acting jointly);  
 
Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions — Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy,’” COM(2010) 343 
(2011/C 318/25), Rapporteur: Mr Jonathan PEEL, C318/150 O.J. 29 Oct. 2011, para. 4.4.1 
(stressing that the EU “should build on its own strengths rather than imitate NAFTA”). 
142. For a catalogue of some of the criticisms of the U.S. Model BIT program and an analysis of 
differences between the 2004 and 2012 Models, see Mark Kantor, The New U.S. Model BIT: If 
Both Sides Are Angry With You, You Must Be Doing Something Right, 5(2) NEW YORK DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION LAWYER (Fall 2012), reprinted in TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT (November 2012).  For 
criticisms from the opposing viewpoint, see Stephen Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty: an Exercise in the Regressive Development of International Law, 3(2) 
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (April 2006). 
143. This is not to suggest that the Commission must entirely reinvent the wheel when it comes to 
determining the wording of its future international investment agreements; only that it need not 
limit itself to adopting the refinements recently pioneered by the United States and Canada, 
which may or may not be suitable to the EU’s purposes. 
144. Previously known as the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
145. Reinisch, Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2, at 155. 
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• What will happen to the existing intra-EU BITs; and  
• Whether the CJEU will accept a system of treaty-based investor-state dispute 
settlement that grants party-appointed arbitrators a role in interpreting and applying 
certain aspects of EU law.146 
I do not disagree with Professor Reinisch’s identification of these three issues as the 
most likely to capture the Court’s attention.  Passing these issues through the prism of 
comparative institutional strengths, however, can again shed a bit of differently colored 
light upon each issue. 
The CJEU is the judicial body tasked with “ensur[ing] that in the interpretation and 
application of the [EU] Treaties the law is observed.”147  Its judges and advocates-general 
are “appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States” for a 
renewable term of six years.148  They must be “persons whose independence is beyond 
doubt and who possess the ability required for appointment to high judicial office.”149  
The Court’s jurisdiction extends to a wide array of matters, from policing the separation 
of powers boundaries between the Member States and the Union150 to hearing complaints 
by private persons against actions taken by EU institutions.151 
When it comes to the EU’s future comprehensive international investment policy, a 
number of possible Court challenge scenarios might arise.  Beginning with the first of the 
three above-identified issues – the question of exclusive EU competency versus “mixed” 
EU-Member State competency to conclude new investment treaties with third states – 
the Court indeed has jurisdiction to decide the issue.152  The EU treaties permit it to do 
so upon application by one or more Member States and/or upon application by any of the 
principal EU institutions involved: Parliament, Council, and Commission.153    
 
146. Id. at 149-50. 
147. Article 19(1), Consolidated TEU. Consolidated TEU, Consolidated TFEU, and EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, supra note 2, at 29 (general structure and jurisdiction of the Court). 
148. Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, art. 254. 
149. Id. See also Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, arts. 251-257 (describing the composition of the 
General Court and of the Court of Justice, the appointment process for judges and advocates 
general, the eligibility requirements for both positions, and the respective jurisdictional 
competencies of the General Court and Court of Justice). 
150. Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, art. 263 (allowing Member States, the Commission, the 
Parliament, and the Council to bring actions for annulment against any EU organ “on grounds of 
lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the 
Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers”). 
151. Id. at arts. 263 and 265 (allowing “any natural or legal person,” under certain conditions, to bring 
an action before the Court). 
152. For purposes of the present analysis, I do not distinguish between actions over which the General 
Court has original jurisdiction and the Court of Justice only appellate jurisdiction, on the one 
hand, and actions over which the Court of Justice has original jurisdiction, on the other.  In any 
event, the treaties confer upon the Court of Justice the right to give the final word on all of the 
matters discussed here.  I therefore refer to the CJEU’s jurisdiction as shorthand for the 
cumulative (and in some cases sequential) jurisdiction of both courts. 
153. An ex ante challenge could be brought under 218(6)(b)(11) and an ex post challenge under art. 263 
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If the matter does end up before the CJEU, the Court’s past decisions suggest that it 
may prove more sympathetic to the Commission’s exclusive competence claim than to the 
mixed competence position asserted by some Member States.154  The Court’s observers 
have long noted its tendency to side with Community institutions in their attempts to 
exercise the broadest plausible interpretation of their enumerated Treaty powers over 
the Member States.  Moreover, the CJEU has demonstrated its eagerness to step in and 
clarify competence issues at the earliest available opportunity.155  Under its existing 
jurisprudence, the Court could resolve the investment treaty-making competence 
question in advance of any actual attempt by the Union to formally adopt an EU-wide 
investment treaty with a third state.156  It could even do so in advance of any attempt by 
the Commission to so much as open negotiations toward a given treaty.157 
From a pragmatic standpoint, however, it is not obvious that this particular 
competence question is best resolved by the Court.  One of the most enduring criticisms 
that the Court has faced is that it has improperly ascribed to itself the role of “an engine 
for the building of the autonomous Community legal order.”158  Without any democratic 
mandate, critics charge, it has pushed the development of the European Union in 
directions never fathomed or assented to by the Member States and their citizens.  This 
 
of the Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2. 
154. I note that the Council has so far hedged on this point, which probably indicates that not all of the 
Member States are in agreement. See, Council-Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment 
Policy, supra note 8, para. 7 (stating that the Council “SUPPORTS the definition of a broad scope 
for the new EU policy in this field as suggested by the Commission, to be further elaborated in full 
respect of the respective competences of the Union and its Member States as defined by the 
Treaties”). 
155. See, e.g., Case 1/75, Opinion of the Court 11 November 1975 given pursuant to Article 228 of the 
EEC Treaty, 1975 E.C.R. 1355, 1359 (1975), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61975CV0001:EN:HTML  (where the Court 
asserted its duty to “forestall [rather than rectify after-the-fact] complications which would result 
from legal disputes concerning the compatibility with the Treaty of international agreements 
binding upon the Community.”). 
156. See Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, art. 218 (11) (“A Member State, the European Parliament, 
the Council or the Commission may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an 
agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties. Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, 
the agreement envisaged may not enter into force unless it is amended or the Treaties are 
revised”).  
157. Opinion 2/94, The Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights Convention 1996 
E.C.R. I-1783, I-1784-I-1785 para 10, 2 C.M.L.R. 265, 287, available at 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61994CV0002:EN:PDF (“where a 
question of competence has to be decided, it is in the interests of the Community Institutions and 
of the States concerned, including non-member countries, to have that question clarified from the 
outset of negotiation and even before the main points of the agreement are negotiated”). 
158. Judge Fernand Schockweiler, La Cour de justice des Communautés européennes dépasse-t-elle les 
limites de ses attributions?, 18 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX, DROIT EUROPEEN 73 (1995).  Most 
scholars agree that the Court chiefly pursues this goal by employing a teleological method of 
interpretation.  See, e.g. Nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice, 20(3) 
FORDHAM J. INT’L L. 656-79 (1997) and references cited therein.  
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criticism featured heavily in debates over the EU’s democratic deficit in the decade 
leading up to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.159  It was partly in response to this that 
the Lisbon Treaty enhanced the legislative powers of the Parliament and placed greater 
cooperation burdens upon the Parliament and the Council acting in tandem.160   
Arguably, then, by making international investment policy subject to the legislative 
co-decision procedure, the Member States have signaled their preference for working out 
their substantive disagreements through a process of inter-institutional dialogue in 
which both the EU institutions and the Member States (acting through the Council) have 
an equal say.  In any event, it is unclear what might be gained by referring a dispute 
over exclusive versus mixed competence in investment treaty matters to the CJEU.  Even 
if the Court were to come down on the side of the EU’s exclusive competence, the 
Council’s special unanimity requirement would nevertheless force the Commission to 
negotiate investment treaties which each and every Member State would be individually 
willing to ratify.  As a practical matter, the best way to do this is to facilitate the active 
involvement of the Member States’ respective investment treaty negotiators in at least 
the first few sets of EU-level negotiations.  This suggests that the competence question 
may be more academic than real. 
The question as to what will become of existing intra-EU BITs raises some similar 
considerations.  If the matter is dealt with through inter-institutional dialogue, the co-
decision procedure (in combination with the special unanimity requirement) will again 
ensure that the eventual solution meets with the satisfaction of all parties concerned.161  
There would be no need for any involvement by the Court.  But what if ensuing events 
instead lead to a showdown between the Commission – which regards intra-EU BITs as 
unlawful under the Treaties – and the Member States that refuse to terminate their 
intra-EU BITs?162   It is under this scenario that the CJEU has a pivotal role to play. 
 
159. See references cited supra, note 81. 
160. See supra note 81. 
161. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in the case of the recently adopted regulation governing 
transitional arrangements for Member States’ extra-EU BITs (EU Regulation establishing 
transitional arrangements, Reinisch, supra note 2.). 
162. In a May 2013 appearance before Parliament, European Commissioner Karel de Gucht (DG 
Trade) stated: 
The Commission agrees that bilateral and investment treaties (BITS) between EU 
Member States do not comply with EU law.  [ . . . ]  All the Member States except one 
have such intra-EU BITS in force.  Commission officials have therefore initiated 
informal discussions with them with a view to reaching agreement on the joint 
termination of all these agreements within an agreed time frame. 
Several Member States have already agreed bilaterally to terminate their agreements, 
and the Commission has encouraged them to proceed with doing so.  However, in those 
cases where Member States are not willing to terminate agreements, the Commission is 
ready to play its role as a guardian of the Treaties so as to ensure compliance with EU 
law. 
 Comments of European Commissioner Karel de Gucht, (DG Trade), European Parliament, 
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When it comes to intra-EU BITs, there can be little doubt that they violate the 
fundamental principles of the Common Market.  By granting either greater substantive 
legal protections163 or greater access to legal remedies164 to investors from some EU 
states than to investors from others, intra-EU BITs contravene the EU’s prohibition 
against discrimination among EU citizens on the basis of nationality.165   
The fact that intra-EU BITs exist at all appears to be an artifact of historical 
oversight.  Their existence was never mentioned in the successive rounds of accession 
treaties concluded between the Community and the newly acceding Member States.  
They continue in force today only because the accession treaties neglected to explicitly 
terminate them.166  And so far, investment arbitration tribunals have found the terms of 
the accession treaties insufficiently definite to conclude that they impliedly terminated 
the intra-EU BITs as a matter of international law.167  The reason why the matter has 
not yet reached the CJEU is probably because the Commission does not wish to 
antagonize the powerful Member States that have balked at the idea of voluntarily 
 
Plenary Session from 20.05.2013 to 23.05.2013, Debate on “Financial responsibility linked to 
investor-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the 
EU is a party,” (May 22, 2013) (transcript available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20130522+ITEM-
019+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN). 
163. Where a BIT’s investment protection standards are higher than those afforded by national and 
EU law. 
164. Since investors, under a BIT, can enforce their rights either through the national courts or 
through international arbitration – the latter being in many cases a more effective means of 
obtaining compensation than the former.  
165. This is prohibited under Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, art. 18.  In a 2012 decision, the 
Frankfurt Court of Appeals (reviewing an arbitration award issued under an intra-EU BIT) found 
that intra-EU BITs may well violate article 18 of the TFEU, since they allow some EU investors 
but not others to initiate arbitration proceedings against certain Member States.  The Court 
nevertheless upheld the arbitration award.  It opined that the proper remedy to the nationality 
based discrimination problem would be to require the Member States to offer the option of 
investor-state arbitration to all EU investors, even in the absence of an applicable BIT.  See 
Eureko v. Slovakia, Case No. 26 SchH 11/10, Frankfurt Court of Appeals, available (in German) 
at: http://www.italaw.com/documents/26schh01110.pdf).  The court’s decision is curious, since it is 
not clear whence the suggested authority to force Member States to grant this expanded consent 
to investor-state arbitration derives.  There is no provision of the EU treaties which purports to 
grant either the EU or the Member States’ courts the power to order Member States to consent to 
investor-state arbitration with all EU investors. 
166. It is to be hoped that the EU will rectify this error in future accession treaties. 
167. The relevant legal provisions governing the implicit termination of international treaties are 
articles 30(2) and 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30(2), 59, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Examples of cases in which arbitral tribunals have assumed jurisdiction over 
investor-state disputes under intra-EU BITs include:  Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic, SCC Case 
No. 088/54, Partial Award (Mar. 2007); Eureko v. Slovakia, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2008-13 Award on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2010); Eureko v. Poland, Partial Award, (Belg. Ad Hoc Ct. 
Arb. 2005); and Ioan Micula and others v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, (Sept. 2008). 
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terminating their intra-EU BITs at a time when the Commission needs their support in 
order to forge a new comprehensive EU external investment policy.168   
Still, intra-EU BITs cannot forever remain in legal limbo.  Either the Commission169 
or an unhappy Member State170 will eventually find an opportune moment to challenge 
them, and when this happens, the Court will almost certainly force the recalcitrant 
Member States’ hands.  The only question is whether it will be worth the judicial 
showdown to reach this inevitable result.  From the perspective of “old Europe” investors 
who are invested in “new Europe” countries, the answer may be yes.  The delayed legal 
fight is worth it to them if it buys a few more years of privileged legal protection in the 
meantime.  This is especially true when it comes to investments in Member States whose 
domestic court systems are considered sub-par by contemporary standards.171  But from 
the perspectives of the rule of law, free and fair competition, and the broader ideals of the 
European project, the answer must be no.  A drag-the-feet strategy only perpetuates 
nationality-based discrimination among EU investors.  In so doing, it also places the 
Member States that maintain intra-EU BITs in perpetual violation of their duty of 
cooperation under the EU Treaties.172   
The CJEU can put an end to this anomalous situation with the stroke of its pen.  As 
the authoritative interpreter of the EU Treaties, the Court possesses the exclusive ability 
to issue final and binding pronouncements on questions of EU law and to order all that 
are subject to its jurisdiction to comply with that law.173  It can, in other words, order the 
Member States to either terminate their existing intra-EU BITs or amend them so as to 
remove their discriminatory provisions and impacts.   
A comparative institutional analysis suggests that the Court should do precisely this 
if and when the intra-EU BITs problem comes before it.  Two principal considerations 
support this conclusion.  First, there is no other body that can end these ongoing 
violations of EU law after political persuasion and compromise have failed.  The 
violations could continue indefinitely if the Court were to stay its hand – hardly an 
appealing outcome.  Second, unlike in the case of the exclusive versus mixed competence 
question, there is no democratic deficit problem to be concerned with here.  Recall that 
 
168. It is nevertheless surprising that none of the EU-Member States that have faced multiple claims 
under intra-EU BITs has sought to bring the matter before the Court. This could in principle be 
done via an infringement action lodged by one Member State against another under art. 259 of the 
Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2. 
169. Id. art. 258. 
170. Perhaps one, like Ireland, whose investors do not enjoy the benefits of any intra-EU BITs. 
171. Particularly because they will enjoy all the benefits of the extended privilege without incurring 
any of the costs of the eventual legal battle.  
172. In the interim, it may also open some of the “old Europe” countries up to unwanted surprises in 
the form of investor-state disputes in the interim – a very real prospect which few of them appear 
to be taking seriously. 
173. See article 19(1) of the Consolidated TEU. Consolidated TEU, Consolidated TFEU, and EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 2, at 29. 
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the task of identifying what role the Court should play in deciding the investment treaty-
making competence question is not really a matter of ascertaining the Court’s 
jurisdiction; the potential value-add of a CJEU decision on that point is undermined by 
the fact that the EU Treaties give the Member States the right to veto the adoption of 
new EU-wide investment laws and policies in any event.174  By contrast, in resolving the 
intra-EU BITs quandary, the Court would merely be exercising its power to order the 
Member States to comply with EU Treaty obligations to which they have already 
consented.  Thus, no comparable political consent problem arises. 
Third and finally, what role should the CJEU play in determining whether the EU’s 
future investment treaties may properly include a system of investor-state dispute 
settlement that grants party-appointed arbitrators a role in interpreting and applying 
some aspects of EU law?  Here I will limit myself to two blunt observations.  The CJEU, 
much like domestic constitutional and supreme courts the world over, is a zealous 
guardian of its own jurisdiction.175  And although countless scholars and judges have 
criticized the Court for overreaching on numerous occasions,176 the Member States have 
yet to adopt any EU treaty amendment which scales back its powers.   
It therefore seems safe to conclude, as the European Parliament has done,177 that the 
EU’s future international investment treaties must find a way to ensure that EU law – 
as articulated by the CJEU – is fully respected and applied within the context of future 
investor-state arbitration proceedings involving EU parties.   Failing this, investment 
arbitration risks meeting with the same fate as every other legal arrangement that has 
ever attempted to free itself of the Court’s control over the development of EU law178 
and/or eschew the application of what the Court regards as mandatory EU law.179  To 
whit – it can expect to receive a big, fat legally binding pronouncement of “not a chance.” 
There is also a yet starker possibility that could arise in respect of investment treaty 
disputes brought against the Union (as opposed to against an individual Member State).  
The CJEU might be tempted to declare itself the appropriate body to hear such claims 
under article 268 of the TFEU, which gives the Court jurisdiction “in disputes relating to 
compensation for damage” involving the non-contractual liability of the Union.180  Such 
 
174. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 65-66. 
175. See Reinisch, supra note 2, at 151-56. 
176. See generally Henri de Waele, The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Integration Process: 
A Contemporary Normative Assessment, 6(1) HANSE L. REV. 3, 1-26 (2010) (providing a discussion 
of the major accusations of judicial activism by the Court). 
177. See Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. 
178. Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2 (the Court has been aggressive on this front through its 
preliminary rulings jurisprudence under art. 267). 
179. See Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton Int’l NV, [1999] E.C.R. I-30555 (finding an arbitration 
award defective due to the arbitral tribunal’s failure to consider and apply EC competition law, 
even though neither party had raised that point before the original tribunal). 
180. Such a possibility would obviously depend upon whether the CJEU would regard investment 
treaty obligations as a form of contractual liability or as a form of non-contractual liability.  In the 
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an outcome would throw into disarray the current plans for developing a shared 
responsibility regulation governing the respective legal and financial liabilities of the 
Union and the Member States in connection with investor-state arbitration proceedings.  
More than that, it could altogether preclude the EU and the Member States from 
consenting to resolve future treaty-based investment disputes before any other forum but 
the CJEU. 
For these reasons, if the EU’s political organs wish to include investor-state 
arbitration provisions in at least some of the EU’s future investment treaties, the wisest 
course would be for the Commission, Council, and Parliament to take great pains to word 
those treaties in such a way as to ensure that no question of a conflict between the EU’s 
external investment treaties and its internal law ever comes before the Court.  This will 
no doubt require developing some creative new textual provisions.  Simply adopting the 
innovations introduced by other countries in their recent model BITs will not suffice to 
address the unique problems that arise in the EU context.  But difficult though the 
drafting challenge may be, the eventual costs of neglecting it probably outweigh the up-
front costs of undertaking it.  The CJEU’s comparative institutional advantage is its 
ability to have the final word on all matters of EU law.  It should be expected – in both 
the prescriptive and normative senses of the word – to play to its strengths. 
Conclusion 
The passage of the Lisbon Treaty announced the dawn of a new era for the European 
Union.  It is to be an era in which democratic participation is deepened, the autonomous 
rights of the Member States are safeguarded with renewed diligence, and uniform 
respect for the rule of European law is demanded equally of Member States, old and new.  
Each of these objectives is embedded in the institutional arrangements by which the EU 
must now forge its comprehensive Union-wide international investment policy.  The 
question as to where European investment policy will go in the future must therefore be 
answered with full awareness of and due respect for the comparative institutional 
strengths and weaknesses of the EU’s Parliament, Council, Commission, and Court. 
 
former case, the treaty’s dispute resolution provisions would presumptively apply.  Any 
incompatibility between those provisions and EU law would, as discussed above, most likely result 
in the invalidation of the non-conforming provisions of the investment treaty.  It is only in the 
latter case (treaty liability not regarded as a form of contractual liability) that article 268 of the 
Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, arguably provides the Court with jurisdiction to decide the 
claim itself.  Note that article 268 refers to article 340, which states:  “[i]n the case of non-
contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the 
laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in 
the performance of their duties."  An EU-wide investment treaty could potentially be viewed as a 
statement of the relevant “general principles common to the laws of the Member States” which the 
Court should apply. See Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2. 
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The Parliament is best suited to conduct a thorough democratic vetting of proposed 
EU investment policies, regulations, and treaties.  Its democratic mandate equips it to 
insist that all new EU investment laws adequately address the concerns raised by EU 
citizens before attaining the requisite parliamentary assent.  When it comes to 
safeguarding the interests of particular Member States, on the other hand, the Council 
takes the pole position.  It is for the Council to ensure that the collective wisdom of the 
Member States’ past experiences with bilateral investment treaties and investor-state 
arbitration claims is reflected in the negotiating mandates it provides to the Commission 
and in the investment-related regulations and treaties it adopts in co-decision with the 
Parliament.   
For its part, the Commission serves two demanding masters.  Fortunately, its first 
mover advantage gives it the flexibility to suggest innovative approaches to closing the 
gap between the investment policy objectives of the Parliament and those of the Council. 
Thanks to its extensive experience negotiating trade agreements on behalf of the Union, 
the Commission is well placed to propose feasible means of accomplishing this difficult 
Parliament/Council coordination task.  
Finally, the Court of Justice of the European Union plays the always-important role of 
judicial backstop.   With its power to resolve competence disputes between the Member 
States and the EU organs, to decide the ultimate fate of intra-EU BITs, and to order the 
alteration of any new external EU investment treaties that do not comply with internal 
EU law, the Court’s potential involvement looms large in the background.  Let us hope 
that this will motivate the relevant actors to work out reasonable solutions on their own.  
But if not, it is comforting to know that the Court can be called upon to resolve contested 
legal issues as necessary. 
Assuming each of the four major EU institutions embraces its new investment-related 
powers in a manner that displays due regard for the comparative institutional 
advantages of its counterparts, Europe’s comprehensive international investment policy 
will emerge through a process of productive inter-institutional dialogue.  The signs so far 
are encouraging.181  While the Council, Parliament, and Commission started off 
advancing disparate and seemingly irreconcilable policy objectives, their recent 
communications have demonstrated a much greater willingness to compromise.  This 
trend is likely to gain further momentum, in my estimation.  The structural checks and 
balances which the Lisbon Treaty imposes upon each institution’s competencies in the 
 
181. See Andrew Gardner, Traumatic Birth for EU-US Trade Talks, EUROPEAN VOICE (June 14, 2013), 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2013/june/traumatic-birth-for-eu-us-trade-talks/77548.aspx 
(“a US demand to talk about the terms of protection for each other's investments – was settled 
early on, with a decision to allow talks.  However, a majority of states, a diplomat from an EU 
member state said, are extremely wary at the prospect of the advent of US-style corporate 
litigation [aka aggressive investor-state arbitration claims].  The EU would, he said, need a big 
trade-off before they would be willing to harmonize investment-protection law”).  
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investment arena effectively prohibit any one institution from moving forward without 
getting the others on board.   
But as this healthy inter-institutional cooperation gathers steam, European decision-
makers should take care not to let momentum overwhelm introspection.  The Lisbon 
Treaty has given them a one-time opportunity to infuse an old international legal regime 
with a new set of democratic ideals.  Only by seizing the chance to reflect critically upon 
what its Member States’ individual investment policies have achieved separately in the 
past can Europe think creatively about what its common investment policy should 
achieve collectively in the future.  If it does so, the Lisbon Treaty may one day be 
regarded as the dawn not only of a more democratic European Union, but also of a more 
democratic international investment law system. 
 
